Thirty-Seven Years of Progress, Undone: Pete Hegseth and the War on Women in Uniform

Women in Uniform

From the earliest branch-specific harassment surveys to the landmark 1995 DoD study, women have fought—and largely won—the right to serve fully and safely. A defense secretary with his own sexual assault allegation is dismantling that progress, one directive at a time.

I served in the Michigan Army National Guard from 1989 to 1993 and went active duty Army through 1996. Those years were formative—and not always in ways that were comfortable to name. The military I served in was one where sexual harassment was common, reporting it was dangerous, and the institutional culture ranged from indifferent to openly hostile toward the women who dared to show up. What changed over the decades since was hard-won. What is being dismantled right now is not a bureaucratic abstraction. It is the architecture of accountability that made it safer—marginally, incrementally, always imperfectly—for women to wear a uniform.

Pete Hegseth, the current Secretary of Defense, is tearing that architecture apart. He is doing it openly, proudly, and with the backing of a president who has made no secret of his contempt for women in public life. The story of what Hegseth is destroying requires understanding what existed before him—and that story begins before I ever signed my enlistment papers.

I. The Baseline: What the Evidence Showed Before Anyone Called It a Crisis

There was no single comprehensive active-duty military sexual harassment study in 1988. What existed instead was a damning accumulation of branch-specific surveys, anecdotal documentation from career military women, and an uncomfortable data point from the most relevant civilian benchmark available.

That benchmark was the U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board survey of federal employees, conducted in 1981 and again in 1988. The USMSPB surveys covered most major branches of the federal government but explicitly excluded active military personnel. What they found, even without the military in the sample, was telling: of the 24 federal agencies included in the 1988 report, the three major branches of the military—Air Force, Army, and Navy—scored in the upper quartile for sexual harassment incidents among their civilian employees. The military services, measured only on their civilian workforces, were among the worst environments in the federal government. The active-duty force was not being counted at all.

The branch-specific surveys that did exist painted a starker picture. A 1980 survey of 90 enlisted women in the Navy found that 90 percent had experienced verbal sexual harassment from peers, and 61 percent had experienced physical sexual harassment from peers. From supervisors: 56 percent verbal, 28 percent physical. Sixty percent reported repeated unwanted requests for dates from peers after initial refusals; 36 percent from supervisors. The researcher also found that harassment directly and negatively affected women's attitudes toward their work environments and their willingness to reenlist. The Navy's retention problem with women was not mysterious. It was documented and it was being created deliberately, one harassing encounter at a time.

A 1985 Air Force survey of more than 12,000 enlisted men and women, conducted as part of a broader organizational assessment delivered to the House Armed Services Committee, found that 27 percent of female respondents reported experiencing sexual harassment over a four-week period. Among men, the figure was 7 percent. Physical harassment specifically was reported by 6.2 percent of women and 1.7 percent of men—in a single month.

This was the documented baseline. Not a baseline of one bad year, but of embedded institutional culture measured across multiple surveys, multiple branches, and multiple decades. This was the U.S. military I joined in 1989. It was not a secret. It was not hidden in classified files. It was in congressional testimony. And the institution spent years debating how seriously to take it.

"90 percent of Navy enlisted women reported verbal sexual harassment from peers. 61 percent reported physical harassment from peers. That data was delivered to Congress in 1985. That is what Pete Hegseth's benchmark year of 1990 was actually protecting."

II. The 1995 Study: The First Comprehensive Reckoning

It was not until 1995 that the Department of Defense commissioned the first comprehensive, cross-branch survey of sexual harassment among active-duty military personnel. The study used two survey forms: Form A replicated the USMSPB methodology from the 1988 civilian employee surveys, enabling a direct comparison; Form B gathered more detailed data on the nature, context, and effects of harassment in the military environment specifically.

The Form A findings answered the question DoD senior officials most wanted answered: Have we improved since 1988? The answer, for the active-duty force measured for the first time as a whole, was: yes—but the baseline being measured against was the civilian workforce, not the branch-specific military surveys that had been showing catastrophic numbers since 1980.

Across the entire active-duty force in 1995, 19 percent of personnel reported one or more incidents of unwanted, uninvited sexual attention at work in the prior year—roughly one in five service members. Among women, the figure was 55 percent. Among men, 14 percent. Compared to the 1988 civilian federal employee data, that represented a decline. Compared to the reality that more than half of all active-duty women were still being harassed in 1995—seven years after congressional testimony about the scope of the problem, four years after Tailhook—it represented a crisis with an improving trendline.

The 1995 study also documented that the climate of reporting remained severely chilled. Women who experienced harassment still largely did not report it, because the institutional response had not reliably shifted toward protection rather than punishment of those who came forward. The survey's data on reporting barriers confirmed what the Navy's 1980 study had found and what women in uniform had been saying for decades: the formal channels existed; using them was dangerous.

What drove even the modest improvement the 1995 numbers showed? In part, external catastrophe. The Tailhook scandal had detonated in 1991, exposing the Navy and Marine Corps as environments where the mass assault of women at a naval aviators' conference—and the subsequent institutional cover-up—was not an aberration but a predictable output of embedded culture. Paula Coughlin, who narrowly escaped rape at Tailhook and became one of its most prominent whistleblowers, paid professionally for years for her willingness to speak. The scandal forced the military to confront, however reluctantly, that protection of perpetrators was the institutional default. Congress began responding. In 1991, it repealed laws barring women from combat aviation. The signal was unmistakable: women's presence in the military was not going away, and the rules would need to evolve.

III. The Long Arc: How Women Won the Right to Fight

The formal exclusion of women from ground combat roles had roots in post-World War II statute, but it was never absolute in practice. Women served near and in combat zones in every major U.S. conflict. In Vietnam, military nurses took fire. In the Gulf War, women flew combat support missions before the legal barriers fell. In Iraq and Afghanistan, female service members were killed, injured, and decorated for valor in roles that the formal policy claimed they weren't occupying.

The architecture of exclusion was a legal fiction that protected an institutional comfort zone while women bled for it anyway.

The formal policy walls fell in stages. In 1991, Congress repealed the combat aviation exclusion. In 1993, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin opened combat ships to women. In 2013, Congress repealed the laws specifically barring women from ground combat. In December 2015, then-Secretary Ash Carter lifted all remaining restrictions, opening every military occupation specialty to women. By 2016, following three years of rigorous study and service-by-service implementation planning, every front-line job in the U.S. military was officially available to qualified women.

The word 'qualified' is not decorative. By the time the last restrictions fell, women competing for combat arms positions—infantry, armor, special operations, pararescue—had to meet the same physical and professional standards as men. Not similar standards. Not adjusted standards. The same standards. More than 5,000 women have since served in combat arms. As of 2026, 174 women have earned Ranger tabs, completing the same selection pipeline alongside roughly 15,000 men.

This did not happen because the military became feminist. It happened because decades of documented performance, legal pressure, and undeniable operational reality made the exclusion policy untenable.

"174 women have earned Ranger tabs under the same standards as their male counterparts. Pete Hegseth has earned a Fox News contract and a sexual assault settlement."

IV. Hegseth's Opening Moves: Purging the Leadership Pipeline

Pete Hegseth was confirmed as Secretary of Defense in early 2025 after a contentious Senate process in which he faced questions about a 2017 sexual assault allegation—an accusation he denies, though he agreed to an undisclosed civil settlement—as well as reports of excessive drinking and financial mismanagement. He was confirmed narrowly.

His first months in office revealed his priorities with clarity. He began systematically removing women from the senior military leadership ranks. Admiral Lisa Franchetti, the first female Chief of Naval Operations and the only woman on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was fired. Air Force Lt. Gen. Jennifer Short, senior military assistant to the Secretary of Defense, was fired. Vice Admiral Shoshana Chatfield, the only female flag officer on NATO's Military Committee, was removed. Vice Admiral Yvette Davids, the first female superintendent of the Naval Academy, was displaced.

The pattern was not coincidental. As of early 2026, there are no female four-star officers on active duty in any branch of the U.S. military. Two years ago, there were four. Hegseth has achieved what decades of exclusion policy never fully accomplished: a senior military command structure with no women at the top.

He also dissolved the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services—DACOWITS—a body created in 1951 that, across Republican and Democratic administrations alike, had provided guidance to the Secretary of Defense on issues affecting women in uniform, including properly fitting body armor, health care, and strategies for addressing gender bias. DACOWITS made over 1,000 recommendations during its history. Ninety-eight percent were implemented in full or in part. Pentagon Press Secretary Kingsley Wilson announced its elimination by stating it had been 'focused on advancing a divisive feminist agenda that hurts combat readiness.'

Hegseth added his own summation on X: 'Gender neutral, color blind, merit based.'

V. The Standards Gambit: Using 'Merit' to Manufacture Exclusion

In September 2025, Hegseth summoned hundreds of generals and admirals to Marine Corps Base Quantico on short notice, in dress uniform, without being told why their attendance was mandatory. He then delivered what observers described as a TED-style speech—borrowing the title of his book—announcing a new directive that all combat positions must 'return to the highest male standard' of their service's physical fitness test.

'If that means no women qualify for some combat jobs, so be it,' he said.

The problem with this directive, as military experts, combat veterans, and multiple members of Congress immediately noted, is that it addressed a problem that does not exist. Women competing for combat arms positions already meet gender-neutral, occupation-specific physical standards. These standards have been in place since the early 1990s when some service branches began integrating women into certain combat roles. The standards for infantry school, special operations selection, and other combat roles are identical for men and women.

What Hegseth appeared to be doing was conflating the rigorous, occupation-specific standards with the broader branch-wide physical fitness tests, which have historically used age- and gender-adjusted scoring. His framing—suggesting that diversity initiatives had softened combat standards for women—was, to use the bluntest accurate word, false. No former Defense official challenged during his confirmation process was able to provide evidence that standards had been lowered. Hegseth offered none either.

Army veteran Elizabeth Dempsey Beggs, one of the first 50 women to serve in combat roles after the 2015 integration, said plainly: 'We've done the studies, and we have the data. He could take that time, energy, money, effort and actually make the lives of service members better, but he's choosing to go down a witch hunt because women have done what he can't.'

Hegseth also announced that 1990 would serve as the benchmark year for assessing whether military standards had been 'softened.' The choice of 1990 is not incidental. It was in 1991 that Congress first began repealing combat exclusion laws. Hegseth, whether through intention or ignorance, chose as his baseline the last year before women's formal inclusion began. The goal is transparent: to define the pre-integration era as the standard to which the military should return.

VI. The Combat Effectiveness Review: The Study That Wasn't Supposed to Close

In December 2025, Undersecretary of Defense Anthony Tata commissioned a six-month independent review of the 'operational effectiveness of ground combat units' ten years after women were permitted in all roles. The review was initially assigned to the Institute for Defense Analyses, and was framed publicly as a routine ten-year policy assessment.

The framing did not survive scrutiny. Previous policy reviews of major military changes—the repeal of Don't Ask, Don't Tell, the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Blended Retirement System—were conducted to evaluate implementation and identify improvements. They were not structured as pretexts for reversal. This review, critics noted, was commissioned by a

Defense Secretary who had said on a podcast the previous year, 'I'm straight up just saying we shouldn't have women in combat roles,' and whose public writings argued that women had made the military 'less effective, less lethal' and 'fighting more complicated.'

By April 2026, the review had been reassigned from IDA to Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, and its deadline had been extended. The Pentagon defended the reassignment as 'standard practice.' The reassignment of a politically sensitive study from one contractor to another, under a Secretary whose stated position is the answer he wants the study to produce, is not a comfortable fact to sit with.

VII. Dismantling the Accountability Architecture: IG, Whistleblowers, and Anonymous Reporting

At the same Quantico speech where Hegseth announced the combat standards directive, he unveiled an equally significant set of changes to the military's internal accountability systems. The targets were the Inspector General process, the Military Equal Opportunity program, and the anonymous complaint mechanisms that service members have used to report sexual harassment, discrimination, and misconduct.

Hegseth called the DoD Inspector General's office 'weaponized' and announced it was putting 'complainers, ideologues and poor performers in the driver's seat.' He signed memos requiring that complaints be identified—ending anonymous reporting—and requiring that complaints deemed 'non-credible' be closed within seven business days. Repeat complaints would no longer be accepted. Anonymous complaints would no longer be accepted.

He called his approach the 'no more walking on eggshells' policy.

What he did not mention is that he was under active investigation by the DoD Inspector General at the time of his speech—an inquiry requested by bipartisan Senate Armed Services Committee leadership, including Republican Chairman Roger Wicker, over his use of the Signal messaging app to discuss military operations in Yemen.

For women in uniform, the implications of ending anonymous reporting are specific and severe. Anonymous complaints for sexual assault—called 'restricted reports'—made up over a third of all sexual assault reports in the military in fiscal year 2024. Restricted reporting allows service members to access medical care and support without triggering a formal investigation, preserving their option to come forward fully on their own timeline. The restricted reporting system exists because decades of evidence showed that removing it reduces total reporting—not because false reports are common, but because the fear of institutional retaliation is real and historically well-founded.

Former Air Force lawyer Rachel VanLandingham noted that eliminating anonymous reporting would shut down a process 'proven to bring to light significant issues that affect morale and discipline within units.' Don Christensen, a former chief Air Force prosecutor, said the changes appeared to be based on anecdote rather than data: 'I don't know of any data that shows there's a crisis of serial complaints.'

Senator Kirsten Gillibrand, who has spent more than a decade working on military sexual assault legislation, was direct: 'It will silence people who want to make sure if there's a rapist in the ranks or a sexual harasser in the ranks that somebody knows about it so that efforts can be made to protect other victims.' She also noted that Hegseth, during his confirmation, pledged to appoint a senior official dedicated to sexual assault prevention and response—and had not done so.

"Anonymous reports for sexual assault made up over a third of all military sexual assault reports in fiscal year 2024. Hegseth wants to eliminate anonymous reporting. He has his own sexual assault allegation."

VIII. The SHARP Confusion: When Culture Overrides Policy

Even where Hegseth's directives have not formally altered sexual harassment policy, the cultural signal has had immediate, measurable effects. Rita Graham, an Army veteran and policy director for the Service Women's Action Network, reported that after the Trump administration began eliminating DEI programs across the federal government, service members on bases began tearing SHARP—Sexual Harassment and Assault Response and Prevention—posters off walls. They were afraid the program itself had been designated a DEI initiative and that displaying its materials was a career risk.

'I saw soldiers going around and ripping SHARP posters off of the wall because they were concerned—truly, genuinely—that it was a DEI program,' Graham said. The confusion was predictable: when institutional leadership sends the signal that women's presence is a problem to be managed rather than a resource to be supported, subordinates read the signs and respond accordingly.

The Pentagon also shuttered the Defense Advisory Committee on Investigation, Prosecution and Defense of Sexual Assault in the Armed Forces—DAC-IPAD—a federal advisory committee that reviewed sexual assault cases and analyzed data and policy across the services. It did so without explanation.

A retired Coast Guard commander, Patti Tutalo, who had served on DACOWITS before its elimination, said: 'I definitely think there will be a retention issue for women. I also think that you're going to see an increase in assaults, increase in harassment, increase in bullying, hazing, and I think there'll be a lack of accountability for those things.'

IX. The Pattern: What This Is and What It Isn't

Hegseth and the Pentagon's spokespersons have been careful, at each step, to insist that sexual harassment and assault remain illegal and will be 'ruthlessly enforced.' This is the language of plausible deniability, not of policy. The architecture that made enforcement possible—the anonymous reporting mechanisms, the independent advisory committees, the watchdog infrastructure, the senior leaders who understood the institutional history—is being systematically removed.

You do not need to formally legalize sexual harassment to recreate the conditions that produced a 64 percent harassment rate in 1988. You need only eliminate the mechanisms that surfaced it, punish the people who reported it, remove the leaders who took it seriously, and fill the resulting vacuum with a culture that signals women's presence is the problem rather than the harassment itself.

The choice of 1990 as Hegseth's baseline year for physical standards was not accidental. That was before Tailhook forced a reckoning. Before Congress began repealing exclusion laws. Before women earned the legal right to serve in the roles they had been informally filling in combat zones for decades. The goal is return—not to a time of greater lethality, but to a time before accountability.

Pete Hegseth served in the Army National Guard and later active duty. He knows exactly how the chain of command shapes what gets reported, what gets investigated, and who gets protected. He is not dismantling accountability infrastructure out of ignorance. He is doing it because he understands precisely what it does.

X. What Stands in the Way

Not everything Hegseth wants is within his unilateral authority. The Uniform Code of Military Justice, which governs how sexual harassment and assault are prosecuted in the military, requires congressional action to change. Laws like the Women, Peace and Security Act of 2017—ironically, signed by Trump himself in his first term with bipartisan support—remain on the books; the Secretary of Defense can minimize their implementation but cannot repeal them.

Some combat exclusion protections are similarly entrenched in statute, and a study finding that women are less effective in combat roles would not automatically restore legal exclusions. Congressional action would be required. That is not a comfort, given the current Congress—but it is a constraint.

What cannot be legislated back, once lost, is institutional culture. The women who fought to earn Ranger tabs, command ships, lead infantry units, and report harassment without being destroyed for it did so by accumulating credibility inside institutions that had to be dragged into acknowledging their service. That credibility lives in the precedents, the data, the advisory committees, and the chain of command relationships that Hegseth is now burning.

Service Women's Action Network President Elisa Cardnell put it plainly: 'A military drawn from the full spectrum of American talent is better equipped to handle the complex threats facing our country.' That is not a DEI talking point. It is operational common sense, confirmed by thirty-seven years of documented evidence—from the 1988 survey baseline to every combat patch earned since.

Ash A. Milton (Amy S. Hamilton) is the editorial voice of Ash a Milton Universe, a publication for long-form political and cultural commentary. She served in the Michigan Army National Guard (1989–1993) and on active duty in the U.S. Army (1993–1996) and the Army Reserves (1996-2000).

Sources

Government and Official Reports

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Reily, A. Sexual Harassment Survey of Navy Enlisted Women (1980). Cited in DoD 1995 study.

Headquarters, United States Air Force: USAF Special Study Team. Sexual Harassment Study (1985). Delivered to the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives.

Department of Defense. The 1995 Sexual Harassment Survey. Defense Manpower Data Center, Report No. 96-014. Arlington, VA: DMDC, 1996. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA323942.pdf

Department of Defense, Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office (SAPRO). Annual Report on Sexual Assault in the Military, Fiscal Years 2012–2024. https://www.sapr.mil/reports

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Greenburg, Jennifer. Deserted: The U.S. Military's Sexual Assault Crisis as a Cost of War. Costs of War Project, Brown University Watson Institute, August 2024. https://costsofwar.watson.brown.edu

RAND Arroyo Center. 'Sexual Assault Experiences in the Active-Component Army: Variation by Year, Gender, Sexual Orientation, and Installation Risk Level.' PMC / National Institutes of Health, 2023. https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC10273889/

RAND National Defense Research Institute. 'Prevalence of Sexual Assault in the Military: Risk and Protective Factors, Data Sources, and Data Uses.' RAND, 2021. https://www.rand.org/pubs/tools/TLA746-2/handbook/resources/data-on-sexual-assault-in-the-military.html

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Seck, Hope Hodge. 'Pentagon's women-in-combat review reassigned; deadline extended.' Marine Corps Times / Military Times, April 14, 2026.

19th News. 'Women combat veterans want Pete Hegseth to know that they already passed the test.' February 11, 2026.

Thomas, Gillian. 'Pete Hegseth Wants Women Out of the Military—and He's Not Hiding It.' ACLU, October 9, 2025.

Military.com. 'Hegseth Wants Male Standard for Combat Roles. Many Female Veterans Say That's Already the Case.' October 1, 2025.

Christian Science Monitor. 'Military officers vow to fight harder for women after Hegseth speech.' October 2, 2025.

CNN. 'Hegseth shuts down group advising on women in the military.' September 24, 2025.

CNN. 'Exclusive: She was the best man for the job: Hegseth's policies are forcing qualified women out of the military.' November 11, 2025.

The Hill. 'Pete Hegseth reignites battle over women's role in military with new standards.' October 2, 2025.

Axios. 'Female vets fire back at Hegseth over claims of lowered military standards.' October 1, 2025.

ABC News. 'No more walking on eggshells: Hegseth vows to lift guardrails on military hazing, harassment.' October 1, 2025.

Military.com. 'As Hegseth Orders Changes to the Pentagon Watchdog, Advocates Say It Will Silence Complaints.' October 3, 2025.

Government Executive. 'Hegseth, Vought actions heighten fears about continued inspector general independence.' October 2, 2025.

WBUR Here & Now. 'Sen. Kirsten Gillibrand says new Pentagon rules on reporting misconduct may silence people.' October 3, 2025.

WHRO / American Homefront Project. 'Advocates worry that the military's DEI purge may discourage sexual harassment and assault reports.' March 16, 2026.

Medill on the Hill / Northwestern University. 'Defense Secretary Hegseth announces overhaul of military complaint, Inspector General programs.' October 10, 2025.

Task & Purpose. 'Sexual assault reports down across military with dip fueled by Army.' May 1, 2025.

NBC News. 'U.S. military sexual assault rates 2 to 4 times higher than govt estimates, study says.' August 14, 2024.

Ms. Magazine. 'Hegseth's Call to Toughness Sparks Concerns About Military Sexual Violence.' October 13, 2025.

NPR. 'Why Hegseth wants to eliminate the Women, Peace and Security program.' May 2, 2025.

USNI News. 'Navy Saw Small Increase in Sexual Assault Reports in FY 2024.' May 1, 2025.

Panetta, Leon E. and Stoneman, Shelly. 'It's been 10 years since women were allowed to serve in combat. There's a lot left to accomplish.' The Hill, January 28, 2023.

Christian Science Monitor. 'These women fought sexual assault in military. Hegseth has them worried.' January 14, 2025.

Axios. 'Hegseth's wartime firing of top generals stuns officials: It's insane.' April 3, 2026.

Time. 'The Army Chief Hegseth Ousted—and the General Who's Taking Over.' April 3, 2026.

Reference and Background

Pew Research Center. 'A Snapshot of Active Duty Women.' December 22, 2011. https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2011/12/22/a-snapshot-of-active-duty-women/

Pew Research Center. '6 facts about the U.S. military's changing demographics.' April 13, 2017.

USAFacts. 'How many people are in the US military? A demographic overview.' March 5, 2026. https://usafacts.org/articles/how-many-people-are-in-the-us-military-a-demographic-overview/

Center for a New American Security (CNAS). 'The (Mostly) Good News on Women in Combat.' May 4, 2018. https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/an-update-on-the-status-of-women-in-combat

Wikipedia. 'Combat Exclusion Policy.' Accessed April 2026. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Combat_Exclusion_Policy

Wikipedia. 'Sexual assault in the United States military.' Accessed April 2026. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sexual_assault_in_the_United_States_military

History.com. 'Women in the US Military: Timeline.' October 9, 2025. https://www.history.com/articles/women-us-military-timeline

Protect Our Defenders / ICASA. 'Facts on United States Military Sexual Violence.' July 2023. https://icasa.org/uploads/documents/Stats-and-Facts/MSA-Fact-Sheet-2023-FINAL.pdf

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