AMERICA AT THE CROSSROADS

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Trump's Board of Peace, the UN Retreat, and the Reshaping of Global Order

A Fair Analysis of America's Changing Role in the World — February 2026

In the span of just thirteen months, the Trump administration has launched what may be the most sweeping transformation of American foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. The United States has withdrawn from 66 international organizations, formally exited the World Health Organization, created an entirely new international body — the Board of Peace — with Donald Trump as its permanent chair, imposed aggressive tariffs on allies and adversaries alike, and watched as neighbors like Canada sprint toward alternative trade arrangements with Europe and Asia. Whether this represents a bold, long-overdue course correction or a reckless abandonment of 80 years of carefully constructed global leadership is a question with enormous stakes — not just for Washington, but for every nation on earth.

This article examines each of these developments in depth, presenting arguments both for and against the administration's approach, while drawing on the latest available data on America's changing standing in the world. The goal is not advocacy but clarity — to help readers think through what is actually happening, what it costs, and where it leads.

The Board of Peace: Trump's New World Order

What Is the Board of Peace?

The Board of Peace was formally announced in September 2025 as part of a 20-point framework to end the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza. By January 22, 2026, Trump had signed its charter at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. On November 17, 2025, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 2803, welcoming the board's establishment and authorizing it to deploy an International Stabilization Force to the Gaza Strip. On February 19, 2026, Trump convened the board's inaugural meeting at the U.S. Institute of Peace in Washington — a building that now officially bears his name — drawing representatives from more than 40 countries.

The board's stated mission is to promote stability, restore governance, and secure enduring peace in areas affected or threatened by conflict. What began as a Gaza-specific initiative has been explicitly framed by its own charter as having global ambitions, prompting considerable debate about whether it is designed to complement — or eventually supplant — the United Nations.

The Structure: A Chairman-Centered Design

The governance architecture of the Board of Peace is unusual by any historical standard. Trump holds permanent chairmanship with no prescribed term limit — the seat is relinquished only voluntarily or by incapacitation, at which time it passes to a designated successor of his choosing. The charter grants Trump sweeping authority to invite or exclude members, break ties, set agendas, and approve or veto all board resolutions. Member nations wishing to hold permanent seats must pay $1 billion into a fund controlled by Trump within the board's first year. Nations unwilling or unable to pay that sum serve three-year terms, renewable at the chairman's discretion.

Bloomberg described this as Trump holding the board's "ultimate decision-making power." Sania Faisal El-Husseini, a professor of international relations at the Arab-American University in Palestine, noted bluntly that the organization "is not an international body with legal personality" — a key distinction from institutions like the UN, whose authority rests on treaty law ratified by member states.

"This is the most prestigious board ever put together. Someday, the Board of Peace is going to almost be looking over the United Nations and making sure it runs properly." — President Donald Trump, February 19, 2026

Who Has Joined — and Who Hasn't

Around 60 countries received invitations to the Board of Peace. As of the inaugural February 2026 meeting, more than 40 had sent representatives, with at least 27 formally signed as founding members. Countries that joined include Argentina, Hungary, India, Pakistan, Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Indonesia, Egypt, and several former Soviet republics. The Executive Board includes Trump's son-in-law Jared Kushner, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, special envoy Steve Witkoff, former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, World Bank President Ajay Banga, and asset management chief Marc Rowan.

Conspicuous absences tell their own story. No countries from Sub-Saharan Africa received invitations. Western European heavyweights — France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Spain — have stayed away, primarily over concerns that Russia could participate in a peace body while actively waging war in Ukraine. The UK sent observers but declined membership. Canada was initially invited, then had its invitation revoked after Prime Minister Mark Carney criticized "American hegemony" in his own Davos speech. Palestine has no representative on the board at all, a fact critics have repeatedly raised as a fundamental contradiction for a body ostensibly dedicated to peace in Gaza.

The $10 Billion Question: Costs and Contributions

At the inaugural meeting, Trump announced that the United States would contribute $10 billion to the Board of Peace's reconstruction fund, while member nations had pledged a collective $7 billion more. Trump described this as a bargain compared to the cost of prolonged conflict, and supporters agree that the ceasefire it helped broker — returning dozens of Israeli hostages held since October 7, 2023 — is a tangible achievement worth significant investment.

Critics note, however, that Congress played no role in authorizing the board. An MS NOW opinion writer characterized it as "the latest in a series of attempted power grabs by Trump," and the $1 billion-per-seat permanent membership fee has been widely criticized as susceptible to corruption. The Better World Campaign, a nonpartisan organization, noted that $2.13 billion in UN contracts went to U.S. companies in 2024 alone — meaning that pulling back from multilateral institutions is not cost-free for American businesses or workers.

A Fair Assessment

The Board of Peace presents a genuine paradox. On one hand, it produced a concrete ceasefire in one of the world's most intractable conflicts, secured billions in reconstruction pledges, and demonstrated that a nimble, deal-oriented body can move faster than the UN Security Council, where great-power politics routinely produce gridlock. Trump's transactional approach — criticized as crass — has brought Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, and Israel into the same room.

On the other hand, the board's legitimacy rests almost entirely on Trump's personal authority, not on international law. Its $1 billion pay-to-play membership structure raises serious questions about accountability and corruption. The absence of Palestinian representation undermines its credibility as a genuine peace mechanism. And the possibility that a U.S. president who is also a private citizen after January 2029 could continue to chair a global institution — influencing which conflicts get addressed and which are ignored — without any democratic oversight is a structural problem that no amount of diplomatic success can fully paper over.

The Great Retreat: US Withdrawal from the WHO and 66 International Organizations

The Scale of the Disengagement

On January 7, 2026, President Trump signed a presidential memorandum directing withdrawal from 66 international organizations — 35 non-UN bodies and 31 entities within the United Nations system. This followed Executive Order 14199, signed on February 4, 2025, which had already initiated withdrawal from the World Health Organization and ended funding to UNRWA, the UN Human Rights Council, and UNESCO. The US withdrawal from the WHO formally took effect on January 22, 2026, exactly one year after it was ordered.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio framed the rationale plainly: these institutions "either have duplicate missions, are mismanaged, are unnecessary, costly and ineffective, are influenced by actors who act in the interests and agendas contrary to ours, or are a threat to the sovereignty, freedoms and overall well-being of our country."

What Was Cut — and What It Means

The scope of what the U.S. has withdrawn from is staggering. Beyond the WHO, the list includes the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) — the underlying treaty for the Paris Agreement, ratified by the U.S. Senate in 1992 and accepted by every nation on earth — and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the world's leading scientific body on climate research. The U.S. has also exited UNESCO for the third time, suspended support for the UN Population Fund, and pulled back from numerous technical bodies governing everything from electoral assistance to conservation.

The financial impact is significant. Between 2024 and 2025, the U.S. contributed $261 million to the WHO — roughly 18% of the agency's operational budget. The U.S. was the largest single provider of official development assistance globally, contributing approximately $65 billion in 2024, or about 30% of total global ODA. The closure of USAID and the freezing of these contributions has forced agencies to scale back programs, lay off staff, and suspend interventions in health, education, food security, and humanitarian response across dozens of low- and middle-income countries.

The withdrawal from the UNFCCC is particularly significant from a legal standpoint. As climate scientist Gina McCarthy noted, it makes the United States "the only country in the world not a part of the UNFCCC treaty" — an agreement with 198 signatory nations upheld by Democratic and Republican administrations alike since 1992. Stanford climate scientist Rob Jackson warned that the withdrawal "gives other nations the excuse to delay their own actions and commitments."

The Case For Withdrawal

The administration's argument is not without merit. The United States has long been the largest single funder of international institutions while exercising influence often disproportionately smaller than its financial contribution. Some UN bodies, including the Human Rights Council, have indeed been captured by governments with poor human rights records, creating perverse situations in which authoritarian states set global human rights standards. UNRWA, it has been credibly established, had employees involved in the October 7, 2023, Hamas attacks on Israel. The case that some of these organizations need fundamental reform — or that the U.S. has a right to demand it — is legitimate.

The administration also contends that bilateral and issue-specific arrangements can deliver results more efficiently than bloated multilateral bureaucracies. The Board of Peace's Gaza ceasefire, negotiated outside the UN framework, is cited as proof. From this perspective, American taxpayers paying into organizations that work against American interests is simply indefensible.

The Case Against

The counterargument is powerful. When the U.S. exits the WHO, it does not stop pandemic viruses from crossing borders — it simply loses its seat at the table where global responses are coordinated. When it leaves the IPCC, climate science does not stop; the U.S. simply loses formal input into the assessments that shape global policy. When it defunds UNRWA, Palestinians in Gaza still need food, medicine, and shelter — they simply receive less of it.

More fundamentally, the institutions the U.S. is abandoning were largely built by the United States after World War II as mechanisms for projecting American values and protecting American interests without having to resort to military force at every turn. The UN system, whatever its flaws, has served American strategic interests for 80 years by creating a rules-based order in which the U.S., as a founding member and permanent Security Council member, holds disproportionate power. Leaving these institutions does not make them disappear — it creates vacuums that China, Russia, and other actors are actively competing to fill.

Focus 2030, an international development research organization, frames the long-term risk starkly: the U.S. withdrawal "reflects a structural shift in international cooperation" toward a world of selective, transactional relationships that "raises a central question for the future of global governance" at a moment when coordinated responses to climate change, pandemics, and economic instability have never been more necessary.

Canada's Carney and the New Trade Architecture

A Neighbour Pivoting Away

If any single development captures the broader geopolitical consequences of America's current direction, it is the extraordinary trajectory of Canada under Prime Minister Mark Carney. The former Bank of England and Bank of Canada governor — widely regarded as one of the world's most sophisticated economic policymakers — has responded to Trump's tariff campaign and sovereignty threats with a strategic pivot that is reshaping Canadian foreign policy in real time.

Speaking at Davos in January 2026 before Trump took the stage, Carney delivered a pointed address to world leaders: "Middle powers must act together because if you are not at the table, you are on the menu." He characterized the current moment as "a rupture, not a transition," and called on like-minded nations to build new frameworks for cooperation. Trump, whose team had threatened 25% tariffs on all Canadian goods and repeatedly floated the suggestion that Canada should become the 51st state, responded by revoking Canada's invitation to the Board of Peace.

The 12-Deal Strategy

Rather than capitulate, Carney doubled down. In the weeks following Davos, he announced a strategy of pursuing 12 new trade agreements across four continents within six months — a pace that would normally take Canada years. Canada concluded agreements with Ecuador and Indonesia, signed investment deals with the UAE, struck a landmark tariff arrangement with China covering canola seeds and electric vehicles, and restarted stalled negotiations with India. Trade Minister Maninder Sidhu announced active targeting of the Philippines, Thailand, the Mercosur bloc, Saudi Arabia, and additional Indo-Pacific partners.

The China deal — described by Carney as a "landmark" arrangement — allows approximately 49,000 Chinese electric vehicles into Canada annually at a reduced tariff rate of 6.1%, in exchange for China lifting retaliatory tariffs on Canadian agricultural products worth more than $7 billion in export opportunities. The deal infuriated the Trump administration. Trump threatened 100% tariffs on Canada if it proceeded, and Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent accused Carney of "virtue-signaling to his globalist friends." Carney was unmoved.

"The world has changed, Washington has changed. There is almost nothing normal in the U.S. now and that's the truth." — Prime Minister Mark Carney, January 2026

The CPTPP-EU Alliance

Perhaps most ambitiously, Carney is spearheading negotiations to link the European Union with the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), the major Indo-Pacific trade bloc. If successful, the proposed alliance would create a trading bloc of nearly 1.5 billion people, representing a substantial portion of global GDP — a bloc explicitly designed to function without the United States at its center. Canada, uniquely positioned as a member of both CUSMA (with the U.S. and Mexico) and the CPTPP, sees itself as the natural bridge-builder.

Policy Magazine's analysis of the situation is direct: "As Carney said at Davos: 'The old order is not coming back. We should not mourn it. Nostalgia is not a strategy.' Trump responded: 'Canada gets a lot of freebies from us.' The distance between those statements is the negotiating space."

What This Means for the U.S.

Canada is not a marginal actor in this story. It receives more than 75% of Canada's exports — a trade relationship worth hundreds of billions of dollars annually, supporting millions of American jobs. The CUSMA (USMCA) trade deal is up for formal review by July 2026. If the relationship deteriorates significantly, American farmers, automakers, energy companies, and manufacturers will feel it directly. Michigan Senator Elissa Slotkin has already warned that disputes over the Gordie Howe International Bridge between Detroit and Windsor — in which Trump threatened to block the opening over ownership disputes — would be "awful" for the state's economy.

The strategic warning is broader still. Canada's pivot is not occurring in isolation. India has accelerated trade negotiations with the EU following its own tariff disputes with Washington. Middle powers from Australia to Indonesia are recalibrating their economic partnerships. The logic of Carney's "variable geometry" — building flexible, issue-specific coalitions that don't depend on U.S. participation — is spreading.

Is the U.S. Losing Global Standing? The Evidence

The Soft Power Numbers

The Brand Finance Global Soft Power Index 2026, released at Davos in January based on surveys of more than 150,000 respondents across 100 countries, delivered a striking verdict: the United States recorded the steepest decline in soft power of any of the 193 nations measured. The U.S. score fell from 79.5 to 74.9 — a drop of 4.6 points — while China climbed to 73.5, closing to within 1.5 points of the American score for the first time. The U.S. still ranks first overall, but the trajectory is notable.

The specific areas of decline are revealing. The U.S. fell 11 ranks in Reputation, with sharp drops in international perceptions of generosity (down 68 positions), good relations with other countries (down 50), and friendliness (down 32). Trust fell 24 positions. Governance indicators including human rights, rule of law, political stability, and ethical standards all weakened. These are precisely the attributes that allow the United States to lead without coercion — the foundations of what Harvard political scientist Joseph Nye famously called "soft power."

The China Factor

While the U.S. retreats from multilateral institutions, China has been methodically investing in them. Beijing has increased its funding to the WHO, elevated Chinese nationals into senior leadership positions at multiple UN agencies, and expanded its Belt and Road Initiative into regions where USAID once provided American-branded development assistance. The argument that "America First" saves money must be weighed against the reality that the spaces the U.S. vacates do not remain empty — they are filled by actors whose interests are often directly opposed to those of the United States.

As Joseph Nye wrote regarding this dynamic: "If Trump thinks he can compete with China while weakening trust among American allies, asserting imperial aspirations, destroying USAID, silencing Voice of America, challenging laws at home, and withdrawing from UN agencies, he is likely to fail." China, for its part, now ranks first globally in perceptions of ease of doing business and future growth potential in the Brand Finance survey — metrics that matter enormously to the developing world nations the U.S. is effectively ceding.

Historic Precedent and Recovery

This is not the first time American global standing has declined. U.S. soft power fell sharply during the Vietnam War, again during the Iraq War, and dipped measurably during Trump's first term. In each case, the United States recovered — often because its underlying strengths in culture, innovation, universities, and economic dynamism proved more durable than any particular administration's choices. American civil society remains vibrant, courts remain independent, and opposition to current policies is active both domestically and within the Republican Party itself. The U.S. House voted 219-211 to repeal Canada tariffs in February 2026, with six Republican defections — a small but telling signal.

The critical question is whether the current rate of institutional disengagement represents a manageable overcorrection that a future administration can reverse, or a structural unraveling of relationships and credibility that will take decades to rebuild. After Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Russia lost virtually all of its soft power — and has not recovered it. Trust, once lost, is rarely restored quickly.

What American Taxpayers Are Actually Paying For

The administration frames its withdrawal from international organizations as saving American taxpayer money. The math deserves scrutiny. The $261 million the U.S. contributed to the WHO annually is equivalent to less than three hours of Pentagon spending. The entire U.S. contribution to the UN regular budget and peacekeeping operations amounts to roughly $3.5 billion per year — less than 0.5% of the federal budget. Against these figures, the United States received substantial returns: preferential access to global health intelligence, treaty enforcement mechanisms, conflict resolution frameworks, and the legitimacy of multilateral cover for actions that would otherwise appear unilateral and coercive.

The Board of Peace, by contrast, will see the U.S. contribute $10 billion — a sum that dwarfs what was spent on any of the organizations being abandoned. The difference is that the Board of Peace is under Trump's personal control, while the UN system operates under rules and norms that apply to the United States as well as others. Whether that distinction represents the elimination of bureaucratic constraints or the abandonment of the rule of law depends very much on one's political philosophy.

Conclusion: What Kind of World Is America Building?

The honest answer to whether Trump's foreign policy revolution is "best for the United States" depends fundamentally on what time horizon you're examining and what you mean by American interests.

In the short term, there are real wins. The Gaza ceasefire is real. Hostages have come home. The Board of Peace has generated billions in reconstruction pledges. Tariff pressure has forced trading partners into negotiations. Canada's CUSMA review gives the U.S. leverage to update a trade agreement that many economists agree needed modernization.

Over a medium and long-term horizon, the picture is more troubling. The U.S. is spending $10 billion on a new institution while abandoning the $261 million contribution to the WHO — a net increase in foreign commitments, not a savings. Allies are accelerating their shift toward alternative partnerships.

China is filling institutional vacuums.

America's soft power — the ability to lead through attraction rather than coercion — is declining at its fastest recorded rate. The rules-based international order that the United States designed and benefited from for 80 years is being systematically dismantled without a clear alternative architecture in place.

Mark Carney has diagnosed the situation with unusual clarity for a sitting head of government: "The multilateral system that has been developing international trade is being eroded, to use a polite term. So the question is: What gets built in its place?" That is the right question. The Board of Peace is one answer — an American-led but narrowly constructed alternative to universal institutions. Whether it can substitute for the breadth, legitimacy, and legal grounding of 80 years of painstakingly constructed international architecture remains, at this early stage, deeply uncertain.

What is not uncertain is that a world in which the United States has withdrawn from 66 international organizations, revoked invitations to allies who dissent, and placed global peacekeeping authority in the hands of a single individual with no term limits or democratic accountability is a fundamentally different world from the one that produced the longest era of great-power peace in modern history. Whether that difference ultimately serves American interests — or humanity's — is the defining question of this era.

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Sources and References

Board of Peace charter and founding documents — U.S. White House, Times of Israel, Britannica, Wikipedia (February 2026)

Brand Finance Global Soft Power Index 2026 — Davos, January 20, 2026

U.S. withdrawal from 66 international organizations — White House Presidential Memorandum, January 7, 2026; Al Jazeera; PBS NewsHour; Focus 2030

Canadian trade strategy — Fortune, CBC, Al Jazeera, Modern Diplomacy, Policy Magazine (January–February 2026)

Board of Peace inaugural meeting — NPR, Better World Campaign, Atlantic Council (February 2026)

Soft power analysis — Joseph S. Nye Jr., Asialink; GWU Globe; Modern Diplomacy; ETS (2025–2026)